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Abstract: 
 
The present essay analyses decision making procedures concerning 
economic issues such as the choice of public goods in the prototype democracy, 
Ancient Athens of the fourth century BC (the “Age of Demosthenes”). It analyses 
the link between political democracy, “economic” democracy, the emergence of 
new institutions and the finance of public goods like defence, education and 
“social security”. The prototype political democracy was advanced in questions 
of public administration, finance and institutions, on which political democracy 
was based. 
The paper concludes with some proposals as to what we could “learn” from 
the workings of “economic democracy” that is relevant for today’s democracies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a vast literature on the history, politics, warfare the arts etc. of the 
ancient Athenian democracy, which is considered the prototype and the origin of 
Western democracies.1 Much less attention has been paid till recently on the 
economics of the Athenian state, which is actually astonishing, since the Athenian 
state could not have developed its advanced political institutions without a sound 
economic basis, and advanced institutions and organisations, as I will purport to 
analyse later on in the present essay. (Kyriazis and Zouboulakis 2004, Kyriazis 
and Halkos 2005, Cohen 1997, Gabrielsen 1994). 
The Athenian democracy was established first by Solon, sometimes during 
the 6th century BC, abolished by the tyrant Hippias and his sons, and re-
established by Cleisthenes in 510-507 BC. It lasted, with small interruptions 
(during 404-403 BC after the defeat by the Spartans at the conclusion of the 
Peloponnesian War, and after 322 BC for about a decade following the defeat by 
the Macedonians) till Greece’s occupation by the Romans during the second half 
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of the 2nd century BC. Even during the first centuries of Roman occupation 
Athens had some form of democratic self governance, within the limits of the 
Roman Empire (Kagan, 1991, Burn, 1962). 
Athenian democracy was evolutionary in its character, with various political 
leaders like Cleisthenes, Themistocles, Ephialtes, Lykourgos, Euboulos and 
Demosthenes introducing political and economic reforms and developing more 
democratic and representative institutions. From a democratic point of view, 
Athens reached its highlights during the second half of the 4th century BC, for 
which we possess also substantial extant information from ancient sources, mainly 
contemporary orators and philosophers2. This period has aptly been called “The 
Age of Demosthenes” and I will focus my analysis on the workings of economic 
democracy on this period...  
In the next section the concept of economic democracy is analysed, 
followed by a presentation of its application in the choice and finance of public 
goods and the emergence of new institutions. The essay concludes with some 
theoretical concepts and proposals as to what we can “learn” from economic 
democracy that might be of relevance for modern democracies. 
 
2. The workings of economic democracy 
 
For Ancient Athenians, political freedom and economic freedom were 
perceived as being two faces of individual democratic freedom. It was self-evident 
to them that the one could not exist without the other, thus again leading to the 
same decision-making procedure applying to both kinds of decisions, i.e. political 
and economic. Both were to be decided by direct voting procedures in the 
Assembly, which needed a quorum.3 
From many points of view, Ancient Athens could be characterised as the 
“first modern economy”. It was the first economy in history, where contributions 
from the services and handicraft (“industrial”) sectors to GDP and employment, 
exceeded that of agriculture4: It had an elaborate system of public administration, 
laws guaranteeing property rights and courts to solve differences of an economic 
nature. Also, as will be analysed later on, it was the first economy to adapt 
“modern” forms of progressive taxation and social policy measures. 
The dictum “No taxation without representation” was fully applied in the 
Athenian democracy, with the difference that in a direct democracy representation 
meant at least a quorum of 6.000 citizens, and usually for important decisions, 
many more. Going one step further, they maintained, that taxes on income and 
wealth represented oppression and were not deemed fit for free citizens. So, for 
most of the period, taxes on income and wealth were not imposed. Only in 
extraordinary circumstances, such as protracted war, was an income tax imposed 
on wealthy citizens. 
Further, they believed in the predominance of the private sector versus the 
state one, with some notable exceptions to be discussed later on, Xenofon for 
example writing: “Those who know how to administrate the private affairs are 
successful also in the public ones, those that are ignorant in the first, fail in both” 
(Xen, Mem. C. IV, 6-12)5. 
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Also, Athens was one of the first market economies, showing high 
specialisation and a great variety of skills within it6. 
This was the economic framework within which economic democracy was 
practised. 
Democracy is a constitution based on argumentation (Dem. 19.184). In an 
assembly democracy like Ancient Athens, debate plays a far more important role 
than in modern parliamentary (indirect) ones. In modern democracies there is 
often a gulf between political debate, which takes place in the media, and 
decision-making, which is mainly done in offices and committee rooms. Also, 
many modern critics maintain that the supply of public goods does not correspond 
to citizens’ demand, either concerning the total supply (oversupply of some public 
goods) or their mix. Some authors, as for example J. Buchanan (1986) go as far as 
arguing that there are ethical limits to taxation, given by a point at which an 
individual citizen would rather choose to ‘secede’, i.e. to withdraw simultaneously 
from both the tax and the benefits sides of the fiscal account7. 
Following this one step further, the existence of the ‘black economy’ and 
tax evasion can be interpreted as a conscious effort of economic agents to avoid 
excessive tax burdens that they feel goes to finance public goods that are of low 
quality or even of no benefit to them (Karayiannis, 2005, Halkos-Kyriazis 2006a). 
8 
In Athens debate took place in the Assembly and led directly to decisions 
therein, concerning all state matters, be it external policy, law making, and 
finances, i.e. the provision of public goods and how to finance them. Ancient 
Athens is of course well known as the ‘prototype’ political democracy. As I 
purport to show, it was also the prototype economic democracy, in the sense of 
active and general participation of it’s citizens in decision making concerning 
economic issues, such as the choice of public goods, mainly but not only, defence. 
I want to underline here, that decisions taken under the principle of ‘economic 
democracy’ are not necessarily better or more correct than those taken under other 
forms of decision making, although in many cases the solutions adopted do seem 
to be farsighted, welfare promoting and also more ‘equalitarian’, as I will analyze 
below. But what is indisputable is that decisions taken under ‘economic 
democracy’ increase responsibility of the individual citizen. By having the right to 
vote on every issue, and very often using actively this right, the Athenian citizen 
did not delegate authority in decision-making, as citizens of modern democracies 
do by delegating decision-making to parties and governments. He took the 
personal responsibility of shaping economic policy and public choice upon 
himself. Correct or wrong decisions were the outcome of his choice and voting. 
Using modern concepts, this decision-making procedure is the first example of 
internalising the benefits and costs of the outcomes of decision-making for every 
active citizen-voter. The outcome could not be perceived as an externality, i.e. 
something given and where the citizen had no, or at best minimal influence, as for 
example in today’s decision making concerning defence, but depended on his own 
choice, expressed through his vote on every issue. In this aspect, I argue that 
Ancient Athens was more advanced than today’s democracies, where decision-
making is indirect. Since Athenians participated by lot in the main 
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“administration” bodies, like the Council of 500 and the courts, for a year each 
time, and most of them in the Assembly, each Athenian accumulated over the 
years a substantial amount of general, but also in some cases of more specialised 
knowledge. Compared to the modern average citizen, the average Athenian citizen 
was better informed on policy questions (Manville and Ober, 2003). 
Economic democracy can be further viewed as a market place for the 
circulation of ideas, in the form of specific proposals on various issues, which 
could be introduced by any citizen. The debate in the Assembly led to the 
adoption (“buying”) of some ideas, and the rejection of others, but the system 
guaranteed the continuous generation of new ideas and proposals. The continuous 
debate in the Assembly can be further seen us a process of optimisation finding in 
collective decision making and the choice of public goods, under competitive 
conditions among those proposing the various policies (Kagan, 1991). 
To paraphrase Arrow (1962), under economic democracy, Athenians 
‘learned by voting’, i.e. they gained experience in financial matters and financial 
administration, learned from past mistakes and restructured their institutions as 
needed. One example is trierarchy. Under this, a rich Athenian was charged with 
the running expenses of a warship (trireme) for a year, as well as giving personal 
service as captain of the same ship. Trierarchy fell on the beginning on single rich 
Athenians. Athenians realised during the course of the 4th century, the limitations, 
both from a ‘justice’ and practical points of view, of this system. So, after a 
proposal by Demosthenes, they introduced the ‘symmoriae’ system, under which 
a group of rich Athenians was collectively responsible for each trierarchy.  
In the second half of the 4th century, for which we have sufficient 
information in the extant ancient sources, the Athenian state had the following 
sources of revenues: 1. Rents from state owned property. 2. Minerals and 
whatever lay beneath the soil belonged to the state, as the silver mines of Lavrion. 
3. Custom duties, of which the most important was the “pentecoste”, a two 
percent one on the value of all imports and exports. 4. The “metoikion”, a 
personal tax on metics (non Athenian free citizens living and working in Athens). 
5. The “pornikon telos”, the license fee paid by all prostitutes to carry out legally 
their profession. 6. Court fees, fines and confiscations. 7. “Eisphora”, property 
tax, which became established on a permanent basis during the second half of the 
4th century. 8. “Liturgies” under which wealthy citizens undertook some “payment 
cum personal service”, of which trierarchy and the plays and religious festivals 
were the most important (Andoc. 1.92-3, 1.133-6, Arist. “Ath. Pol.” 47.2, 47.4, 
52.1, Dem. 35.29-30, 23.167, 24.50, 47.31, 50.8, Aesch. 1.199-200, Harp., 
“metoikion”, “parakatabole”, and “theorikon”, Hansen 1999, Gabrielsen 1994). 
Athenian state revenues varied during this time from a low of 200 talents 
per year to an average of 400 in the 340’s, rising to 1200 by the early 330’s after 
the reforms and the capable administration of Lykourgos9 (Plut. Mor. 852F). 
What is important to underline is that at that time Athens did not possess 
and empire like it had during the 5th century, so it had to finance its policies from 
its own revenues. What is truly important to keep in mind is that due to the 
changes in its economic structure, the Athenian economy was flourishing and 
generated enough revenues for the state to finance the various public goods that 
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will be discussed below. All the more, during the 4th century Athens showed 
social stability, without revolts, revolutions etc. that characterised many other 
Greek city-states. It offered enough opportunities of employment to its citizens so 
that there was no need for some of them to seek new “homes” abroad by creating 
new colonies. Even more, it offered so many good employment opportunities that 
it attracted substantial numbers of metics (free foreign citizens) to work in Athens, 
as many as one third of the number of free adult Athenian citizens. In this respect 
also, Athens showed modern characteristics like today’s developed countries (i.e. 
EU, USA, etc) where a substantial number of foreign citizens live and work (But 
in none of today’s countries, except perhaps some Arabic ones like Dubai, is the 
percentage of foreigners to citizens as high as above 30%!). 
 
3. Financing of public goods 
 
The revenues were used to finance: 
 
1. Administration (Assembly, Council of 500 and Courts, for an estimated total 
of 80-100 talents per year (Hansen 1999). 
2. Military expenditure, which, as with most ancient states was the most costly 
item. This included the fixed naval berths and port installations, cavalry 
fodder, foreign mercenaries and citizens armies, the naval crews, and the 
“police force”, of mercenaries called “Scythian archers”. It did not comprise 
the upkeep cost of warships (trieres) when in service, which was the task of 
trierarchy. What is of interest here is the fact that Athens was the first state 
to have both a standing navy (the biggest in the Eastern Mediterranean at the 
time) and a standing army (although a small one, mainly a cavalry force). 
This was a decision taken many times during different periods under the 
principle of economic democracy. The citizens decided, after hearing the 
various arguments in favour and against, to provide for themselves the 
public good “defence” at specified amounts (i.e. so many ships to be build, 
to be in commission, the number of mercenaries to be hired for a specific 
time of service, the number of citizens to participate for duty and specific 
expeditions etc), at a specific cost, which would be financed out of state 
revenues whose burthen would fall on all citizens. (On some, the rich ones 
directly, in the form either of “trierarchy” or payment of the “eisphora” tax, 
or both, on the rest indirectly in the form of opportunity cost, since once the 
state revenue was earmarked for defence, it could not be used for other 
policies, some of them of direct benefits to some citizens groups). 
 
But what was unique at the time was the introduction of financing of “public 
goods” which have a modern character: “Education” and “social policy”. 
The Athenian state was the first one in history to introduce a ‘public 
education system’ and some ‘social policy’ measures. 
It may appear strange to write that Athens spent revenue on the public good 
‘education’. It is of course true, that ancient states did not have a system of public 
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education (schools, universities etc), this being considered a private choice, the 
cost of which should be born by the beneficiary.  
The famous private philosophic schools of the 4th century, like Plato’s 
Academy, are well known. But Athenians seem to have felt that these schools, as 
well as the children’s private teachers (known as ‘paidotrivai’) could be afforded 
only by relatively well to do families, and not the poorer ones. They felt that 
poorer citizens should at least partake of some sort of education, financed through 
the state’s (i.e. the Assembly’s) decision to introduce the ‘theorika’ i.e. the 
production of theatrical plays. The cost of producing the play was one of the 
litourgies, falling on the richer citizens, and thus having again a redistributive 
function. But Athens went a step further, by being the first state in history to 
introduce at least one element of publicly financed ‘education’, this being the 
theatrical plays. As we have seen, theatrical performances had to perform one 
important educational function (teaching ‘morals’, history, mythology and 
religion). All Athenian citizens should be able to benefit from attending the 
performances. Since performances took place during daytime and lasted during 
the whole day for a four-day period, the poorer citizens would have to loose four 
days wages (or remuneration from work) in order to attend. Many would not be 
able to afford this loss. So, they had to be compensated, and the ‘theorika’ was 
introduced, being a payment to poorer citizens, allowing them to attend 
performances and compensation for wages and remuneration lost. Seen in this 
light, ‘theorika’ was the first educational programme in history financed by a state 
for the benefit of a substantial part of the citizen’s population. 
Lastly, social policy measures· Athens was again the first state in history to 
introduce social policy programmes that have a ‘modern’ character. They had a 
sort of ‘social security’ (or poor relief) for disabled persons with no means of 
support. These persons could be registered with the Council and receive a subsidy 
of one obol and later two obols per day. Further, if a citizen died in battle the state 
undertook the upbringing of any under-age sons. Moreover, at times of food 
shortages, the state often distributed corn, either free or subsidized (Lys. 24.26, 
Arist. Ath. Pol. 49.4. Aeschin. 3.154, 1.103-4). The re-distributive character of 
these social policy measures is clear and strong, since the beneficiaries, poor 
citizens, were paying no taxes at all, while the rich were taxed to generate the 
revenue used to finance these measures. 
 
4. Economic democracy as a system of check and balances 
 
By the middle of the fourth century (about 355 BC) new politicians 
appeared in the Athenian political scene, Euboulos, Lykourgos and Demosthenes 
among them. While the first two represented a new policy line, that of peace and 
concentration on internal affairs, Demosthenes represented the “war party”, trying 
to make the Athenians aware of the new threat, that of the rising Macedon of 
Phillip. During the period up to 338 BC (battle of Chaironia, in which Philip 
decisively beat the Athenians and Thebans) the peace party seemed to have the 
upper hand, with some years of peace, and some of rather localised hostilities, but 
never full scale war like during the Peloponnesian and the first half of the fourth 
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century. Then, during 338-322, under Lykourgos, Athens enjoyed years of total 
peace (Sakellariou 1972). 
During these periods, Euboulos and Lykourgos used the principle of 
economic democracy in order to propose and have accepted a new policy of check 
and balances between the various interest groups among the Athenian citizens, 
and possibly also metics. Metics did not vote, but I assume that they could exert 
some influence through Athenians with whom they collaborated. 
Euboulos and Lykourgos proposed the following compromise: The poorer 
Athenians, the main benefactors in war time, since they had permanent 
employment and remuneration as rowers in the fleet, would refrain from voting 
for war, in exchange of remuneration in peace time. This took the form of 
increased payment for “theorika” (i.e. attending public ceremonies like the 
theatre, but also employment in the various public bodies like the Assembly and 
the Courts, as stated above). Through the continuous voting procedure under the 
principles of “economic democracy”, the poorer citizens-voters were guaranteed 
that they would have stable employment and remuneration in peace-time. The 
richer citizens, entrepreneurs, bankers, etc. gained from this compromise by 
having the possibility to pursue their interest (profit making) without the 
uncertainty and dangers of war. In exchange, they accepted some forms of 
contributions to the state (i.e. to the benefit of the poorer citizens) both out of the 
state revenues per se, (as exposed above), but also out of their own revenues, in 
the form of accepting “litourgies” and also the imposition, for the first time, of an 
income – wealth tax (eisphora). 
This was the ingenious solution implemented by Euboulos and Lykourgos 
in order to achieve peace through a policy which balanced the interests of the 
various interest groups. 
In today’s interpretation, it can be argued, that Euboulos and Lykourgos 
implemented for the first time a “social contract” which was not a fiction as 
postulated by philosophers of the Enlightment like J.J. Rousseau, Voltaire, J. 
Locke, D. Hume, etc. but a reality that came about through direct voting on 
economic issues. 
Through the system of continuous voting and consequently learning to 
calculate benefits as the outcome of each voting round (or game) the Athenians 
achieved a system of mutual advantage. 
During this period, prosperity returned to Athens, which showed, as 
mentioned above, signs of economic strength and growth. In fact, public finances 
were so flourishing, that after paying for the various standard expenditures 
described above, these was a substantial surplus, which was used to continue the 
embellishment of the city with public monuments (like the theatre of Dionysus 
under the Akropolis). 
In the light of modern theory, another additional interpretation is possible.  
Buchanan and Tullock (1962, chapter 14) postulate that individuals in their 
constitutional roles do not choose directly the size and scope of the public sector. 
First, they choose the fundamental organisation of activity. Second, they choose 
the decision making rules. According to my interpretation of economic democracy 
in Ancient Athens, the above seems to be exactly what happened. First, during the 
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5th and early 4th century BC, the Athenians agreed and elaborated the fundamental 
framework of democracy, i.e. who would have voting rights (all free male citizens 
above the age of 18), who would have the right to be elected to various 
magistrates (all free male citizens according to some seniority rules, different for 
each body) and the various government bodies and magistrates. (Assembly, 
Courts, heads of different Funds, “President of the Democracy” (the “eponymos 
archon”, who was elected for a year in the beginning and later chosen by lot and 
who gave his name to the year), the heads of the military (“generals”, always 
elected) etc. 
After establishing the framework (which evolved steadily during the two 
centuries), they established the decision-making rules, which were fairly simple 
and remained unchanged: Universal voting in the ruling body, the Assembly, and 
decisions under simple majority. All free male Athenians over 18 could vote, and 
a quorum of 6000 was necessary. Additional rules (again simple majority voting) 
were elaborated for the other bodies, like the Court (the “judges”, 500, were 
chosen by lot). 
The finance of public goods, and thus also the size of the state budget and 
sector, resulted out of the voting-decision-making rules in the framework of 
economic democracy. 
Again, Buchanan and Tullock (1962 p. 37) remark that private action forces 
the individual to exercise his freedom by making choices compulsory, while in 
collective choice the individual loses the sense of decision making responsibility. 
This seems to be one of the major problems of modern democracies, manifested in 
great abstinence from voting in general elections etc. Economic democracy, as 
practiced in Ancient Athens was a practical solution to this problem: Individuals 
were compelled by their own rational – individualistic calculations of their 
personal interest, to behave in matters of public choice (choice of public goods, 
their “quantities” and their finance) in exactly the same way as in questions of 
private choice.  
Through economic democracy the effects of public choice are no more 
perceived as externalities (on which individuals can exert minimal influence, if at 
all) but they are internalised. 
“Constitutional economics”, while accepting that politics are the 
adjustments of interests, postulate that this is done not statically (i.e. in a single 
point in time, the Election Day) but through a continuous process. In other terms, 
politics is a dynamic game, and participants can calculate their “returns” through a 
cost-benefit analysis over a certain time horizon. Allowing this, two very 
important conclusions follow: First, we have a learning possibility for each 
individual, which is taken into account after each decision and the calculation of 
its net welfare effect on him. Learning means in this case, that the individual 
decision maker includes each additional information resulting from past cost-
benefit calculation in his decision making, thus enlarging the set of his strategic 
options for the next step of the “game”, i.e. the next decision. The individual tries 
to maximize his welfare on each step of the game, but taking account of past 
results, he can adopt new strategies in the future, which he believes will give 
better results. Within this set of new strategies, a more “dramatic” option would 
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be for him to try to change the rules themselves, for example by trying to establish 
a new coalition with other individuals having similar interests. 
Again, we have the first example of this happening, in Ancient Athens in 
482 BC. Then, perceiving the threat of a new Persian invasion, Themistocles 
proposed his famous Naval Law or Decree, to build 200 new “triremes” warships 
within two years. In order to pass the law in the Assembly, Themistocles managed 
to bring about a new coalition, mainly based on the poorer citizens, who up to 
then could vote, but could not be elected to offices. He convinced them, that the 
fleet would offer them employment and remuneration as rowers, and once the 
Persians were repelled, they would have full political rights (They would be 
eligible to all state offices). The new coalition united the poorer citizens with the 
then emerging entrepreneurial class (ship owners, merchants, “industrialists” and 
hand workers-artisans) against the old aristocracy of landowners and farmers. The 
new coalition won, and thus Athens was transformed into a sea power and the 
most representative democracy in the world till then (Kyriazis – Zouboulakis 
2004). 
Second, once we accept the possibility of learning and the formation of new 
coalitions, the possibility of side-payments within the coalition becomes also a 
possibility. This again makes the formation of larger and more stable coalitions 
possible. In a dynamic situation, logrolling becomes a possibility and this brings 
about compromises between the interests of the various individuals and groups. In 
the long run this may result in a positive sum game (Buchanan and Tullock, 
(1962, pp. 148, 151-154). 
Economic democracy as practised in Ancient Athens, achieved such a 
result. The policy of Euboulos and Lykourgos described above corresponds 
exactly to a situation when logrolling is practised and side payments are involved. 
In this case, side payments were the “social policy” measures (“theorika” etc) in 
favour of the poorer members of the coalition. 
The interpretation of economic democracy in the light of constitutional 
economics as applied to Ancient Athens can be extended further. 
 
5. The emergence of new economic institutions and organisations 
 
In parallel to the evolution of political institutions, new economic 
institutions and organisation forms were developed, following Athens becoming a 
sea power after 480 BC. 
Aristoteles proposed a thesis stating that sea power and democracy go hand 
in hand. Athens, his main example, shows that sea power and democracy are also 
linked to economic development and the emergence of new institutions and 
organisation forms, such as the safeguard of property rights, legal developments 
concerning contracts, the formation of share companies (predecessors of joint-
stock companies), insurances and a banking system. 
Athens is a case where we can observe these developments since we have 
sufficient extant evidence from ancient sources on this. Similar developments 
probably did take place in maritime Phoenician states and Carthago (for which we 
lack much evidence), Rhodes (the Rodian maritime law was very developed and 
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formed the basis for Roman law) and medieval Italian states like Venice and 
Genoa (Greif 2006, Kyriazis 2006). 
Athens developed strong legal institutions to protect property rights. 
Property was held to be inviolable, and, as part of a system of incentives for 
economic activity, even slaves could own some types of property (excluding 
land). The courts were responsible for solving legal disputes concerning property 
rights, safeguarding among others, legal contracts of associations. It appears that 
business associations, especially in relation to seaborne trade and finance, were 
common. These associations were the prototypes of joint-stock companies 
(Hyper, For Eux., 35, Arist. Ethics E., 1942β, 14-17). Contracts were often 
written, and as Demosthenes writes (Lacr. 39) the written contract stipulates “that 
nothing has more validity than its conditions, and nobody has the right to appeal 
to any law or decree, or anything else against this written agreement”. Athenians 
understood the utility of this organisation form both as a means of raising 
substantial capital sums, and as a means of risk sharing, as is made clear for 
example by Xenofon (Res. IV, 27-32). 
As Cohen (1997) has analysed, Athenian banking system was very 
developed during the fourth century, Athenian banks offering almost all services 
offered by modern banks (including, as the famous Satyros, King of Pontus 
litigation has preserved, offshore services). Among others, maritime loans with 
various collaterals, and the use of bills of exchange, were widespread (Isoc., Trap. 
35). 
The Athenian institutional set-up consciously strived to reduce transaction 
costs, so as to enhance economic activity. A particularly striking example of this, 
is Nicophon’s law on silver coinage (375-374 BC), whose purpose was the 
safeguard against fraud and the facilitation of currency circulation and exchange. 
(Ober, (forthcoming), Taxation and liturgies (which can be regarded as a very 
special form of taxation) were also developed trying and in general succeeding, to 
generate low transaction costs (Lyttkens, 1994). 
Ongoing analysis of Athenian institutions and organisations shows that they 
had some very modern characteristics. 
 
6. Conclusions: Can we learn from the prototype democracy? 
 
I have analysed above the working of the Athenian democracy with 
emphasis on the decision-making  procedures concerning public finances and the 
choice and provision of public goods. As ahead stated by Aristoteles and later 
taken up by many philosophers and political scientists, notably J.S. Mill (1861), 
perhaps one of the most important ideas to be found in relation to democracy, is 
the one which aims at the creation of a citizens society where they are active in 
politics and economics so that they achieve the completion of their personalities. 
They express their ‘virtue’ (the Greek word being ‘areti’) in taking part in 
decision-making in solving public problems for the ‘common good’. Sovereign 
citizens in a democracy must take part in this decision-making procedure, because 
this is the way, for them to be masters of their own fate, and the fate of their 
societies and their states (Macpherson 1977, Paparrigopoulos 1984). Seen in this 
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light, citizens’ participation and involvement in decision-making is the 
cornerstone of democracy. 
Modern authors, as Sen (1999, 1993) propose a conception of democracy as 
a way of constructing a move global point of view out of more local points of 
view, linked to the concept of “positional objectivity”. People have often reason to 
change their position from a local to a global one, and democracy is a way to 
construct such a shared point of view. Democracy is government by discussion 
among equals and a collective engagement in practical reason (Devey 1927, 
Habermas 1996, Anderson 2003) and voting is a mechanism for aggregating 
individual preferences. Learning from experience, trying out different policies to 
see what works, experimenting with different public policies to see what works 
are paradigms of exercises in practical reason. 
But, as pointed out by modern authors, (f.e. Downs (1957)) citizens of 
todays democracies are both ill-informed about the issues on which they have to 
decide (even if this decision takes the form of one all encompassing “general” 
vote for one party) and reluctant to vote. One of Downs somewhat surprising 
conclusions is that a rational person will devote little effort to becoming well 
informed before voting. Throughout the history of political theory there has been 
much preaching aimed at “improving” the voter. Down’s demonstration that the 
voter was behaving sensibly not only suggests why all of this preaching has been 
unsuccessful, but also indicates that the preachers have been wrong, or that 
preaching is not the correct means of “improving” the voter. 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962 p. 204) support Down’s finding by their 
introduction of the cost of decision making. These costs may become too large 
relative to the possible reduction in expected external costs that collective action 
might produce. If direct democracy were required, the individual, in his presumed 
role as constitutional choice maker, would leave many activities of the State to be 
organised in the private sector. Representative government is a means of reducing 
this decision making costs. 
Economic democracy on the other hand, gives strong incentives to voters to 
be well informed, since through their decision making they internalise both 
benefits and costs. 
Direct democracy, also in relation to economic questions, as practised in 
Athens, increases the knowledge of voters, moving them as postulated by Sen and 
others, from local to move synthetic, global viewpoints. This, in the sense of 
Buchanan and Tullock, increases consensus and also, enlarges the choice set of 
strategies. A particular example of this is the enlargement of the choice set 
inherent in Themistocles Naval Law. He proposed to include in the choice set, 
which before included just one choice (i.e. to share the revenue of the Lavrion 
silver mines equally among all citizens) a second one, (i.e. to devote the revenue 
to finance a fleet, it to acquire a public good, defence, as against a private one, i.e. 
consumption). 
It is clear, that the implementation of the second alternative involved 
increased knowledge for every voter: Themistocles made clear the effects of his 
proposal for the city as a whole, and for the individual. Benefits for the city (i.e. 
the public good aspect of the strategy) meant that the city’s freedom against the 
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threat of Persian occupation would be preserved. Benefits for the individual voter 
(the private aspect of the strategy) meant that the individual voter would preserved 
his “immaterial” values, i.e. freedom, religion, way of life etc., combined with 
material ones, i.e., renumeration as rowers for the warships. 
Athenian democracy, as practised also in the economic sphere, does show 
the workings of the postulates of the modern advocacies of democracy exposed 
briefly above. The exchange of views, permanent voting, resulted in increased 
knowledge and motivation in the Athenian voter, increased the choice set of 
strategies, and for a lengthy period brought about cultural and economic 
development.  
Recently, some modern authors (Manville and Ober 2003, Doukas 2005) 
have pointed out that there is much to learn from the workings of Ancient 
Athenian democracy when applied to modern organisation theory, concerning 
mainly the motivation of persons working for organisations and enterprises. 
Manville and Ober characterise f.e. the Athenians as a moral community with a 
business orientation. 
Athenians evolved under economic democracy an elaborate structure of 
decision-making, but also forms of revenues for the budget that have a very 
modern character, like progressive income-property taxation. They solved also 
successfully problems facing  modern democracies concerning public choice and 
the provision of public goods like defence. Through the procedure of continuous 
voting (or ‘referendums’, as they may be called using modern terminology) they 
acquired knowledge, evolved an elaborate institutional setting, and expressed their 
preferences concerning both the choice and the amounts of the public goods to be 
provided. 
Today’s representative democracies have gone away from the old Athenian 
(and other Greek city-states) ideal of participate democracy.10 Still, during the last 
decades of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, some states and societies 
seem to have started to reintroduce elements of participative democracy at many 
levels, while some, like the Swiss Federation never stopped using it.11 
Tomorrows technology, through for example an electronic ‘voting-card and 
signature’ for every citizen, may enable the increased reintroduction of ‘economic 
democracy’, while increased awareness by citizens of their rights, as well as of the 
repercussion of decisions taken which affect their lives, may force politicians to 
move in this direction. Once introduced, this is a self-reinforcing process, as it 
was in Ancient Athens. Citizens become more aware of the stakes, and they have 
incentives to acquire more information and become more ‘qualified’ in decision-
making. Coupled with modern technology, which reduces the cost of decision-
making, economic democracy is a practical means of improving the working of 
today’s democracies.  
Thus “economic democracy” and “teledemocracy” become mutually 
reinforcing12.  
Could we perhaps foresee in the future an emulation of the Athenian 
economic democracy, by introducing an electronic market place for debate on 
ideas and proposals on specific issues, in which every citizen would be able to put 
forward his proposal or counter-proposal? Could this lead then to referendums if 
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any issue invites a sufficient number of electronic votes? (i.e., some kind of 
quorum). In the sense of constitutional economics, this kind of electronic market 
place would lead to consensus building, at the same time lowering expected 
decision making costs (or transactions costs according to Coase) which without 
the existence of the electronic market place are sometimes very high and so 
inhibit the building of decisive coalitions.  
Thus, it is worthwhile to study the model of Ancient Athenian democracy, 
also in the case of decision-making concerning public choice, finance and 
economics in general. 
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Notes: 
                                                 
1 For the political institutions etc of 4th century Athens, see fe Hansen (1999) 
and the extensive literature given therein, and for a review of the discussion 
concerning the economic and social aspects, see M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-
Naquet (1980). 
2 This period was the “golden age” of letters and orators, like Plato and 
Aristoteles, Lysias, Aeschines, Hyperides and the greatest orator of ancient times, 
Demosthenes. 
3 The Assembly was one (the most important) political body in Athens. All free 
male citizens (abaout 30.000 according to most estimates during the 4th century) 
had the right to participate and to vote. The quorum required was 6.000. For 
details see Hansen (1999). 
4 The same may also have been true of the maritime Phoenician States in the 6th 
century, like Tyre and Sidon, and possibly 3rd century Carthago, for all of which 
we lack sufficient extant ancient evidence to “prove” it. This happened again 
during late Medieval times for some Italian maritime-commercial states like 
Venice and Genoa, and for the first time in the modern era with the United 
Provinces-Dutch Republic in the early 17th century. 
5 In this sense Ancient Athens anticipated the proposals of the monetarist school 
proponents like Friedman, Lucas, Sargent etc. and the liberals like F.A. von 
Hayek etc. by 24 centuries! 
6 Aristophanes in the “Birds” makes fun of it. Before the main character 
Pisthetairos creates his ideal state (a pun of course to philosophers attempts to 
create ideal states, like fe his near contemporary Plato) various experts come 
forward to him and offer their services, for a fee: Among them a lawyer to sell 
good laws, a geometrician to sell “urban planning services”, a seer, an overseer 
etc. For us, this is a good indication of the workings of a market of services and of 
the variety of services to be had! Xen (Mem. B. VII, 6) mentions many 
“tradesmen” who were wealthy enough to undertake liturgies, while about 170 
different occupations have been counted (Karayannis 2007). This shows the high 
degree of specialisation in the Athenian market economy. 
7 Aristotle in the “Politics” (Arist. Pol. 1304β19-1305α7) points out that the 
majority decisions of the humble folk (who are the majority in a democracy and in 
the Athenian Assembly) may drive the well-to-do minority into rebellion. Yet, that 
never became a problem in 4th century Athens, showing that the Athenian state 
had managed to establish a system of, in modern terms, “checks and balances” so 
that the advantages of democracy, even for the well to do evidently outweighted 
the disadvantage of being sometimes in minority. (Lys. 19.57, Dem. 21.62-3, 
Hansen 1999). See also text for Euboulos policies in this context.  
8 According to Karayiannis (2005) answering a questionnaire, 56% of the Greek 
entrepreneurs of the survey maintained that they committed tax evasion as a 
purely defensive measure, because they felt that they paid too high taxes 
compared to the benefits derived from the states various policies.  
9 A talent was 6,000 drachmae, when at this period a skilled worker or artisan 
received a daily wage of about one and a half drachmae. 
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10 For a history of ‘participative’ democracy within liberal democracy, see 
Macpherson 1977. 
11 An example of this are the referendums undertaken in some European 
(France, Netherlands) Union states concerning the new European Constitution.  
12 Concerning “teledemocracy” see Slaton (1992), Grossman (1995) and Morris 
(1999). 
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